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RECENT DECISIONS
been interpreted to mean that whenever the intoxication of a defend-
ant arises upon the evidence in a trial for murder, the jury should
say whether such intoxication prevented the intent, premeditation and
deliberation essential to constitute the crime and failure to so instruct
is error although no request to so charge is made on the defendant's
behalf. People v. VanZandt, 224 N. Y. 354, 120 N. E. 725 (1918);
People v. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, 38 N. E. 322 (1894). This rule
applies not only to total, but to partial intoxication also. People v.
Gerdvine, 210 N. Y. 184, 104 N. E. 129 (1914). But where a person,
after previously determining to commit a homicide, voluntarily drinks
himself into a state of intoxication, it is no defense under the Code.
People' v. Koerner, 191 N. Y. 528, 84 N. E. 1117 (1908); State V.
Shelton, 164 N. C. 513, 79 S. E. 883 (1913).
PARENT AND CHILD--NEGLIGENcE-An action brought by an in-
fant, his mother as guardian ad litem, against his father, defehdant,
to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident
by reason of the defendant's negligence. Held, the suit could not be
maintained inasmuch as a child under the age of 14 could not recover
damages against the parent on the above stated facts. Judgment
reversed and cause remanded with instructions to sustain demurrers.
Wick v. Wick, 212 N. W. 787 (Wisc. 1927).
Inasmuch as there are no English cases as a precedent the infer-
ence may be drawn that such action was not maintainable at common
law. Up to the year of 1891, this issue was not decided by an
appellate court until the case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9
So. 885 (1891), wherein it was held that the action was untenable.
Following this adjudication, many states have based their decisions,
most consistently and in surprising judicial harmony. McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247,
114 N. W. 763 (1908); Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E.
12 (1923); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. Rep. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924);
Materese v. Materese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Mannion v.
Mannion, 3 N. J. Misc. 68, 129 At. 431 (1925). In support of this
doctrine, the reasons advanced are on the ground of public policy.
The family consists of a unit of sanctity, wherein the strongest natural
ties bind all of its members to mutual love, interest and welfare. For
to question parental authority encourages the impairment and under-
mining of the wholesome influence of the home. ' The disruption of the
fireside's peacefulness and stability is the proximate result. However,
-where one staxiding in loco parentis is guilty of excessively punish-
ing a child, he is liable for damages. Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N. W. 173 (1925).
In the able dissent of Crownhart, J., it is pointed out that the
Constitution of Wisconsin, Art. I, Sect. 9, provides for the relief of
any person for injuries received to his person, property or character.
As to a principle of common law, the maxim is "there is no wrong
without a remedy." Especially well stressed- is this forceful argu-
ment. Why is a cause of action by an infant against his parent
tenable for a debt due or for an accounting of trust funds or for the
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recovery of real estate and untenable for personal injuries? "Are
property rights, strictly speaking, of more importance to the infant
than the rights of person?"
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-EQUITABLE JURISDICTION-In 1919, the
appellant Bockler contracted to buy from Wurfel certain realty on
which was located a store building together with the merchandise
contained therein. Part of the purchase price was to be paid in cash,
the balance by delivery of a deed of a lot in Portland. Appellant
moved upon the premises where he remained for five years. Wurfel,
after considerable trouble perfected his title and tendered a deed which
was not accepted. He sued for specific performance. The court
denied a decree, finding that his title was defective as to part of the
realty and -that the lot to be deeded by Bockler was owned by his
wife who had not joined in the contract. Mrs. Bockler then began
an action to have removed an alleged cloud upon her title. Her hus-
band was joined as a party defendant. Held, that Mrs. Bockler was
the absolute owner of the Portland lot, that Wurfel should recover
from the appellant Bockler $3500, the agreed value of the lot, and
made this sum a lien upon the property purchased. Pending appeal,
Wurfel issued execution and at the public sale became the purchaser
of the property. Bockler v. Wurfel, et al., 254 Pac. 353 (Sup. Ct.
Oregon, 1927).
Appellant's principal objection was that the result was wholly
inequitable, his vendor now having both the property and a substan-
tial part of the purchase price. This seemingly carried force, but the
court pointed out that the vendee had had the use of the store for
five years and quoted from his testimony to show the value of the
business to him. The appellant's further objection that the passage of
time precluded a decree of specific performance of the original agree-
ment was disapproved. Time was not of the essence, the vendor
had perfected his title without having been guilty of laches, and the
court could at this time properly decree specific performance of the
original agreement to the extent possible. Katz v. Hathaway, 66
Wash. 355, 119 Pac. 804 (1911).
The trial court in proceeding to dispose finally of the entire con-
troversy was held to have properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction.
This accords with general principles of Equity and with the doctrine
of similar cases. Wood v. Hill 214 App. Div. 417, 212 N. Y. Supp.
550 (1925).; Madsen v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781
(1925). As was well said in Brown v. Winne, 92 Okla. 289, 219 Pac.
114 (1923), "A Court of Equity which once obtains jurisdiction of a
controversy administers complete relief."
EQUITY-ORAL AGREEMENT TO Buy PROPERTY AND HOLD FOR MORT-
GAGOR-STATUTE or FRAUDS.-The. plaintiff executed a deed of trust on
a plantation to defendants as security for loans. By written agree-
ment defendant Tchula was to operate the property for plaintiff's
benefit until 1925, but in February, 1924, plaintiff was informed that
the property would be sold in March, 1924, due to the pressure of the
state bank examiner. It was thereupon verbally agreed that the de-
